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Most of the time, the connections between fiduciary obligation and tort law receive little 
theoretical attention. To be sure, scholars engaged with fiduciary obligation occasionally note 
that the law categorizes breach of fiduciary obligation as a tort, at least in the United States.1 In 
contrast, whether—or to what extent—fiduciary obligation should be understood as a form of 
bilateral contract has long been a dominant focus for scholarship. In this essay, I make a case for 
the salience of tort. My specific focus is a type of tortious conduct necessarily linked to breach of 
fiduciary obligation: participating in a fiduciary’s breach of duty, whether by lending substantial 
assistance or otherwise. The tort subjects the actor who culpably participates in fiduciary breach 
to liability that’s accessory to the liability of the primary tortfeasor, who breached a fiduciary 
duty. Within a broad understanding of tort law, knowingly to participate in a fiduciary’s breach 
of duty contravenes a right, held by the beneficiary of that duty, not to be mistreated in a 
particular way.2 This accessory tort’s elements are well established and relatively stable across 
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1RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979), discussed in Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 925 (2006). 
2John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference 
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jurisdictions in the United States.3 What’s controversial is how the tort applies to particular 
categories of actors, most recently investment bankers who act as target companies’ advisors in 
merger and acquisition (“M&A”) transactions.4 In particular, when the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed a $76 million judgment against an investment bank that knowingly gave substantial 
assistance to directors’ breaches of fiduciary duty, the size of the award was stunning but the 
underlying theory of liability was not novel.5 The bank’s liability was premised on its knowing 
participation in a wrong committed by the primary defendants, the directors of the bank’s 
corporate client.     
 Additionally, the essay explores the implications when the primary actor breaches a duty 
that’s not a fiduciary obligation imposed by law but a duty imposed or created by a contract that 
explicitly eliminates or supplants conventional fiduciary duties.6 Accessory actors may 
knowingly participate in breaches of governance duties in non-corporate entities, such as limited 
                                                                                                                                                             
with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 380 (“[e]ach tort defines a right not to be mistreated in a 
particular way.”). 
3In contrast, English law has been less stable in recent decades. For comparisons with the United 
States, see Deborah A. DeMott, Accessory Disloyalty: Comparative Perspectives on Substantial 
Assistance to Fiduciary Breach, in EQUITY, TRUSTS & COMMERCE (Paul S. Davies & James E. 
Penner eds.)(forthcoming 2017)(hereinafter DeMott, Accessory Disloyalty). 
4The tort’s applicability to lawyers, not my focus here, is a perennial source of controversy. Nor 
is the law necessarily consistent across jurisdictions. See, e.g, Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 
816 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2016)(applying Texas law and dismissing with prejudice case alleging that 
lawyers and law firms aided and abetted client’s Ponzi scheme; under Texas law fraud is not an 
exception to attorney immunity from suit, including immunity from suits brought by parties other 
than party-opponents in litigation, when the lawyer’s disputed conduct is of the sort in which 
lawyers engage when representing clients); Neogenix Oncology, Inc. v. Gordon, 133 F. Supp. 3d 
539 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)(applying New York law; aiding-and-abetting claim against law firm when 
client’s CFO paid finders’ fees to unlicensed brokers survives motion to dismiss and is not 
entirely duplicative of claim alleging firm breached its fiduciary duty).   
5RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). 
6The limited scope of this essay precludes full consideration of issues generated when a 
contractual provision mimics a fiduciary duty. Section 4 discusses some of the basics.  
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partnerships and limited liability companies (“LLCs”). As Delaware law permits, the entity’s 
organizational documents may eliminate fiduciary duties and specify governance obligations 
solely through contract. In this non-fiduciary turf, another accessory tort may be relevant:  
wrongful interference with contract.7 Although much in this context awaits further development, 
I identify parallels and overlaps that connect wrongful interference to culpable participation in a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Both are intentional torts and instances of accessory liability premised 
on an actor’s decision to participate, in some fashion, in another actor’s breach of a duty owed to 
a third party. For both torts, liability requires that the accessory actor’s conduct be informed by 
knowledge of the primary duty or its breach and that it make a causally significant contribution 
to the wrong suffered by the party to whom the primary actor owes a duty. Both torts also 
underscore the foundational analytic significance of duty. That is, actors subject to liability on 
accessory theories do not owe duties that replicate those of the primary wrongdoer to the 
beneficiary, who are parties linked by a contract or a fiduciary relationship. By committing an 
intentional tort, accessory actors breach duties they themselves owe.  
  Situating the inquiry within the ambit of tort law more generally helps explain the 
distinctive wrongs that these torts represent and helps to explain the structure of this limb of tort 
law. Thus framed, the outcomes in recent M&A cases are not departures from well-established 
tort doctrine. The essay opens with an overview of the elements of these two accessory torts, 
then turns to theoretical perspectives on accessory liability to identify the distinctiveness of these 
forms of wrongful conduct. I conclude with illustrative cases demonstrating when these torts 
have bite in connection with governance obligations, whether defined by conventional fiduciary 
                                                 
7For discussion of this point, see section 4.  
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duties or by contract. This account is weighted toward cases from Delaware courts, given 
Delaware’s prominence as a situs for incorporation and for the organization of many non-
corporate entities, especially publicly-traded vehicles structured as limited partnerships. 
 
2. CULPABLE PARTICIPATION IN FIDUCIARY BREACH AND TORTIOUS 





Clarity about terminology is crucial for what follows, in part because an accessory actor’s 
participation in a primary breach of duty may take many forms. An accessory’s conduct that 
induces or instigates a breach of fiduciary duty, including through agreement with the fiduciary, 
occurs prior to—or almost simultaneously with—the fiduciary’s decision to breach the duty. In 
contrast, conduct by an accessory that assists the fiduciary’s breach may follow the fiduciary’s 
decision to breach. As we’ll see in section 3, some accounts of accessory culpability use the 
vocabulary of authorship, which is illuminating but can also require adaptation to accommodate 
the diverse forms of accessory conduct. More significantly, participation in fiduciary breach 
often is labeled “aiding-and-abetting” liability.8 To be sure “aiding and abetting” encompasses 
assisting a fiduciary breach but not so naturally accessory conduct—like instigation or 
inducement—that precedes the fiduciary’s decision to breach her duty. The essay’s chosen 
generic term, “culpable participation,” covers the breadth of accessory conduct, consistently with 
the cases.   
Elements of Culpable Participation 
                                                 
8See Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135 (2006). 
  -5- 
Like wrongful interference with contract, culpable participation in fiduciary breach is a nominate 
tort with specified elements that the plaintiff must allege and establish.9 Many Delaware cases 
apply the formulation in Malpiede v. Towson, which requires the plaintiff to show: (1) the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty; (3) the defendant’s 
knowing participation in that breach; and (4) damages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the 
defendant’s breach.10 Thus, an accessory’s liability is contingent on another actor’s breach of 
duty, but the accessory’s liability constitutes an independent wrong, not an instance of vicarious 
liability.11 Although the accessory’s liability is joint and several with the fiduciary’s, accessory 
liability does not require that their culpability be identical. As a consequence, as we’ll see in 
section 4, a defendant may be subject to accessory liability through knowing participation in a 
fiduciary’s negligent breach of duty. Having committed an independent (and intentional) tort, an 
accessory defendant does not benefit from exculpation available to a negligent corporate 
fiduciary.12 The intentional character of the tort also has implications for insurability and for the 
accessory’s rights to contribution.13  
 As section 1 notes, the requisites for this form of accessory liability do not vary in 
substance across US jurisdictions, despite some differences in phrasing.14 Regardless, when a 
                                                 
9Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes proposed that all nominate torts be subsumed in a 
single formula for liability, a “general theory” of tort liability, premised on acting with the 
intention of harming another. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1894), discussed in Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 358. Holmes’s proposed 
reduction was controversial. Id.  
10780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001). 
11See DeMott, Accessory Disloyalty, supra note 3. . 
12English law is to the same effect. PAUL S. DAVIES, ACCESSORY LIABILITY 55 (2016). 
13See section 4 on contribution. 
14See AngioScore, Inc. v. TriReme Med., LLC., 70 F. Supp. 3d 951, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2014)(noting 
that parties cited California and Delaware law “essentially interchangeably”). 
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fiduciary duty is owed to an entity, Delaware law treats culpable participation in breach as 
wrongdoing that bears on the entity’s internal affairs, with the consequence that Delaware law 
applies.15 Additionally, an accessory who culpably participates in a breach of fiduciary duty 
owed to a Delaware entity may not—via the doctrine of in pari delicto—defend against the claim 
by charging the entity itself with its fiduciary’s wrongful conduct. This is because in pari delicto 
is inapplicable to a principal’s suits against its own fiduciaries, and Delaware positions accessory 
defendants inside the fiduciary ambit for this purpose.16 Reinforcing uniformity across 
jurisdictions on the basic structure of the tort, Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876 states 
the general elements requisite for accessory torts in terms comparable to the formulation in 
Malpiede.17      
 Some accessory defendants are culpable participants in the fiduciary’s breach of duty at 
its point of origin through a concerted plan or an express agreement with the fiduciary. In 
Heckmann v. Ahmanson, the accessory defendants, a group that had purchased stock in Walt 
Disney Productions, agreed with the corporation’s directors to a greenmail transaction: the 
                                                 
15See, e.g., Stewart v. Wilmington Trust SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 319 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 126 
A.3d 1115 (Del. 2015).  
16See Stewart, 112 A.3d at 319. This outcome was presaged by dictum in In re Am. Int’l Grp. 
Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 822 (Del. Ch. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
of La. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 11 A.3d 228 (Del. 2011).  
17Entitled “Persons Acting in Concert,” section 876 states: 
 For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is 
subject to liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common 
design with him, or 
 (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives 
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or 
 (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious 
result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to 
the third person. 
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corporation would repurchase the group’s stock at a price above market and above the group’s  
acquisition cost, in exchange for the group’s agreement not to buy more stock and to dismiss 
individual claims in ongoing litigation against the directors that sought to block a defensive 
acquisition transaction.18 The court held that if the Disney directors breached their fiduciary duty 
to the company’s stockholders, the greenmail group could be subject to joint liability as an aider 
and abettor, knowing as its members did that the stock repurchase would be at a price 
“considerably above market value to enable the Disney directors to retain control of the 
corporation,” and knowing as well that Disney would fund the repurchase by assuming debt in an 
amount that would adversely affect its credit rating and stock price.19 The group would be 
subject to joint liability with the directors on the basis of a “common plan or design to commit a 
tort ....”20  Later cases more cleanly differentiate between aider-and-abettor liability and 
conspirators who adopt the primary actor’s tort as their own.21 
 More recent cases illustrate that the linchpin on which an alleged accessory’s liability 
often turns is the element of knowing participation, albeit in the absence of a “common plan or 
                                                 
18168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985). . 
19Id. at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84. 
20Id. at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 184. This holding exemplifies liability under Restatement (Second) 
§ 876(a). Separately, the accessory defendants did not agree to dismiss derivative claims they 
had asserted against Disney’s directors in the same suit. The court held that by filing the 
derivative claims, the greenmailing group assumed a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s other 
shareholders as to those claims. Id. at 128, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 183. This separate holding would 
support liability under Restatement (Second) § 876 (c).  
21See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2003)(act of 
aiding and abetting is distinct from primary violation; liability attaches because aider and abettor 
“behaves in a manner that enables the primary violator to commit the underlying tort”); Prairie 
Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Holding Corp., 132 A.3d 35, 63-64 (Del. Ch. 2015)(claim that actor 
aided and abetted primary actor’s fraud is distinct from claim that two actors conspired, acting 
pursuant to a common plan as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts  
§ 876 (a); “[i]n some cases the distinction makes a difference. In others, it doesn’t.”)(footnotes to 
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design” or prior agreement. Recent cases also illustrate the range of circumstances that may be 
congenial to claims of culpable participation, prominent among them post-associational claims.  
In AngioScore, Inc. v. TriReme Medical, LLC, the founder of a manufacturer of surgical devices 
subsequently founded a competing firm (which had corporate affiliates) while he was still a 
director of the manufacturer. The court held that the facts alleged by the plaintiff (the 
manufacturer) amply supported an inference that the competitors’ directors knew that the 
founder remained on the manufacturer’s board.22 For one thing, the founder’s own knowledge of 
his breaches of duty to the manufacturer was imputed to the competitors, given his role as an 
officer and director of those entities.23 Although the accessory defendants characterized their 
conduct as typical or routine, not extraordinary, doing so would not insulate them from liability 
stemming from sales of a product that competed directly with the plaintiff’s.  
 Most likely courts assess the elements requisite to knowing participation in light of the 
parties’ relationships, in AngioScore the ties between the same individual actor and successively-
formed entities to which he owed fiduciary duties.24 In contrast, in In re Answers Corp. 
                                                                                                                                                             
citations omitted).  
22AngioScore, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 958. 
2370 F. Supp. 3d at 958. For a different assessment of knowledge in a post-associational dispute, 
see Schroeder v. Pinterest, Inc., 133 A.D. 3d 12, 25-26, 17 N.Y.S.3d 678, 689 (2015)(claim by 
inventor of website application against competitor that allegedly misappropriated application 
after investor in LLC formed by inventor co-formed new entity—the competitor—and gave it 
information about application; although inventor stated claim of breach of fiduciary duty against 
investor under Delaware law given investor’s status as a director of LLC at the time he shared 
information with competitor, aiding-and-abetting claim against competitor fails because inventor 
did not allege with particularity facts sufficient to demonstrate that competing entity knew of 
investor’s involvement with inventor’s LLC, including his fiduciary ties to it).      
24Although the prospect of financial gain can help establish that an aider and abettor knew of and 
substantially assisted the primary wrongdoer, financial gain itself is not an element of the tort. 
See Neilson, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 1127-28 (applying California law, and noting that reference in 
Heckmann to accessory “‘reaping the benefit’” of primary breach of duty does not add a 
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Shareholders Litigation., in the wake of a merger with a buyout group, shareholders of the target 
corporation alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the target’s directors, aided and abetted by the 
buyout group.25 The court found insufficient evidence of breach of fiduciary duty by the 
directors and, more significantly for our immediate purposes, insufficient evidence of knowing 
participation by the buyout group. In particular, the court was unwilling to interpret negotiations 
between the two sides as evidence of their exchange of confidential information elsewhere; all 
that the plaintiffs’ evidence established was that “even arm’s length negotiators need to email 
one another to complete a deal and that sometimes they offer suggestions on how to expedite the 
deal, which the opposing party may accept or reject.”26 Likewise, in In re Dole Food Co. 
Stockholder Litigation, at trial the plaintiffs established breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
by Dole’s controlling shareholder and the corporation’s general counsel in connection with a 
merger transaction through which the controlling shareholder bought the corporation’s remaining 
shares.27 But the plaintiffs’ claim against the investment bank that assisted the controlling 
shareholder failed because the bank itself made no misrepresentations to Dole’s shareholders or 
directors and did not know about or participate in the manipulations and misrepresentations that 
                                                                                                                                                             
substantive requirement to the tort, quoting 168 Cal. App. 3d at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177). 
252014 WL 463163 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2014).  
262014 WL 463163 at * 16. 
272015 WL 5052214 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). Some cases disapprove of substantial assistance 
claims against actors who themselves owe fiduciary duties, as Dole’s general counsel 
unquestionably did. Compare  Calesa Assocs., L.P. v. American Capital, Ltd., 2016 WL 770251 
at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016)(if characterized as a controlling shareholder, private-equity 
investor that benefitted through dilutive share issuance would itself owe fiduciary duties and 
aiding-and-abetting claim would fail for lack of a non-fiduciary defendant; court reserves 
determination of investor’s status so that alternative aiding-and-abetting claim remains available) 
with Neogenix Oncology, Inc. v. Gordon,133 F. Supp. 3d 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)(aiding-and-
abetting claim against law firm premised on firm’s involvement in CFO’s payment of finders’ 
fees to unlicensed brokers not entirely duplicative of breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
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constituted the fiduciary breaches and gave rise to damages.28 To be sure, some bank personnel 
may have had “reason to be concerned that something may have been amiss” but their client ties, 
at least at that time, were to the controlling shareholder. And by sharing confidential Dole 
information with its client, the bank would not categorically breach any duty to the corporation.29      
 Additionally, Dole held that liability premised on culpable participation requires a 
distinct causal showing, which is that the accessory’s conduct was the proximate cause of 
damage to the plaintiff.30 Thus, even had the investment bank in Dole transgressed by dividing 
its loyalties between the company and its controlling shareholder, the court was unpersuaded that 
the bank’s conduct resulted in harm. Accessory liability also requires that the plaintiff have 
suffered a loss that’s legally cognizable. In Trustees of the Upstate New York Engineers Pension 
Fund v. Ivy Asset Management, an investment adviser did not disclose to a pension-fund client 
that it harbored serious doubts about the investment opportunities—in time revealed as a 
precedent-setting Ponzi scheme—offered by Bernard Madoff.31 To be sure the advisor breached 
its fiduciary client to its client and facilitated Madoff’s scheme when the pension fund continued 
to invest with Madoff with no caution from the advisor, but in the final reckoning the fund did 
not suffer a legally cognizable loss. Through interim withdrawals32 of fictitious “profits” from its 
                                                                                                                                                             
firm).  
282015 WL 5052214 at * 32. 
292015 WL 5052214 at *43-44. 
30Relatedly, when showing causation will ultimately require showing reasonable reliance, an 
aiding-and-abetting claim will fail if reliance would not have been justifiable. See Mosier v. 
Stonefield  Josephson, Inc., 815 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016)(auditor’s work could not 
have furnished substantial assistance to fraud perpetrated by corporation on investors unless 
potential investors relied on auditor’s reports). 
31131 F. Supp. 3d 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
32Totaling $32,974,742. Clawbacks cannot recover monies withdrawn more than two years 
before the date of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 124. 
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Madoff account that were not subject to clawback as fraudulent transfers, the fund withdrew 
more than its net investment.33 The fund’s claim to the balance of fictitious “profits” shown on 
its final account statement from Madoff did not represent a legally cognizable loss.34         
 Some commentators on accessory liability suggest that a sort of legal hydraulics may be 
operative. That is, as Richard Mason observes, aiding-and-abetting claims focused on breach of 
fiduciary duty are relatively easier for plaintiffs than when the primary tort is common-law 
fraud.35 Mason argues that the “elevated duty” owed by the fiduciary may make the nexus 
between the accessory defendant and harm to the plaintiff more apparent and, the higher the 
primary duty, the stronger its pull toward accessory liability. Reflecting on English and 
Australian cases, Joachim Dietrich and Pauline Ridge see the strongest grounds for accessory 
liability when the accessory’s conduct “consists of procurement of the primary wrong,”36 as the 
greenmail-seeking group may have done in Heckmann. More generally, what’s requisite to 
proving an accessory’s knowledge of wrongdoing may be lessened when the accessory derives 
(or plans to derive) benefit from it.37 
 However, the survey of cases recounted above suggests caution about “legal hydraulics” 
                                                 
33Totaling $5,725,258. In this context, “net” investment is the amount invested minus the amount 
withdrawn. Id. 
34Id. at 122. 
35Mason, supra note 8, at 1163-64. Along these lines, a jurisdiction may recognize aiding-and-
abetting claims when the primary wrong is breach of fiduciary duty but not fraud. See Grayson v. 
Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2016)(applying South Carolina law in suit brought by 
Ponzi-fund victims against alleged participants in scheme; although South Carolina cases discuss 
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting an abuse of legal process, no 
South Carolina case appears to recognize a claim of aiding and abetting common law fraud) For 
state-by-state data, see Mason, supra note 8. 
36JOACHIM DIETRICH & PAULINE RIDGE, ACCESSORIES IN PRIVATE LAW 232 (2016). 
37Nielson, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (discussing, in particular, Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed 
Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
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as among the elements requisite to liability. In Dole, the court held the primary defendants—the 
corporation’s controlling shareholder and its general counsel—jointly and severally liable to the 
corporation’s non-controlling shareholders for damages totaling $148,190,590.18, finding that 
both fiduciaries acted intentionally and in bad faith in breaching their fiduciary duties.38 But the 
extreme character in Dole of the primary defendants’ breaches did not lessen the causal showing 
required to impose liability on the accessory defendant, the arguably conflicted investment 
bank.39 Similarly, in Engineers Pension Fund, the investment advisor, having liquidated its 
proprietary funds’ Madoff investments, did not share its suspicions with its client’s trustees, 
while continuing to accept fees linked to the client’s Madoff account, which constituted conduct 
consistent with enabling Madoff’s scam to remain operative. Extreme facts, to be sure, but 
ineffective—indeed beside the point as the court structured its analysis—to negate the 
consequences of the fact that the pension fund suffered no legally cognizable loss. 
Tortious Interference with Contract 
The tort of wrongful interference with contractual relations, like the tort of culpable participation 
in fiduciary breach, is geared to protect interests defined by other legal doctrines. As defined by 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 766, an actor commits the tort through “intentionally and 
                                                 
38Characterized as a “rarity,” the outcome in Dole was framed in a journalistic account as 
preceded by long-standing frictions between the company’s controlling shareholder and hedge-
fund investors who bought shares “on the eve of the buyout” with the objective of seeking a 
higher price through post-merger appraisal proceedings. Liz Hoffman, Dole CEO Must Pay 
Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2015, at B4. Reportedly, Dole, which uses the port of 
Wilmington to import fruit into the United States, “pressed Delaware lawmakers and even the 
state’s governor to tighten laws around shareholder lawsuits ....” Id.   
39Of course, a plaintiff’s claim against an accessory defendants fails if the primary claim  of 
breach of fiduciary duty fails. See, e.g., In re Molycorp, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 
3454925 at * 11 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2015); Higher Educ. Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Mathews, 2014 
WL 5573325 *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2014).  
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wrongfully interfering with the performance of a contract ... between another and a third party by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract ....” The elements of 
the tort, as articulated in Delaware cases, are: (1) a contract, (2) known to the defendant, (3) an 
intentional act by the defendant that is a significant factor in causing the breach of the contract, 
(4) without justification, (5) which causes injury.40 As comments to Restatement (Second) 
recognize, interfering with another actor’s economic interests may not be wrongful at all and 
may well be integral to the operation of a free-market economy characterized by robust 
competition.41 And a basic assumption about the primary wrong—breach of contract—is that it 
does not constitute a tort. Thus, it’s crucial how tort law assesses justification for interference. 
Restatement (Second) structures this inquiry around a list of seven factors.42 These are: (a) the 
nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the 
actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social 
interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and contractual interests of the other, (f) 
the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations 
between the parties.  
 Since the completion of this portion of the Second Restatement in the late 1970's, judicial 
and academic audiences for legal texts may find multi-factor inquiries that are not ordered by 
relative importance to be unsatisfying.43 In any event, some of the seven Restatement factors 
                                                 
40Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983, 992 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
41RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. g (“it is thought that the social interest in 
competition would be unduly prejudiced if one were to be prohibited from in any manner 
persuading a competitor’s prospective customers not to deal with him.”). 
42The seven factors were endorsed as stating Delaware law in WaveDivision Hldgs., LLC v. 
Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 49 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Del 2012).  
43See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176 (7 th Cir. 
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relevant to justification overlap with the tort’s definitional elements, including the actor’s 
knowledge and intent, plus the nature of the harm. And the analysis in cases applying the factors 
may imply priorities among them. For example, an actor who interferes with mixed motives—
perhaps the protection of its own interests as a creditor as well as a desire to interfere—may 
succeed in showing justification.44 More restrictively, some courts require that interference be 
through the use of “unlawful means,” which under New York law does not encompass 
persuasion alone albeit knowingly oriented toward interference.45  
 In contrast, culpable participation in a fiduciary’s breach of duty is not defined by the 
means used or sieved through a mesh of justification, nor does the court assess the interests 
sought to be advanced through participation in the breach. Additionally, broader concerns with 
freedom of action and social interests are not part of the inquiry into whether an actor culpably 
participated in a breach of fiduciary duty. But tortious interference with contract, like culpable 
participation in fiduciary breach, requires that the defendant have acted with knowledge related 
to legal rights, and the court’s inquiry into the means of interference and the defendant’s conduct 
can raise issues related to—if not precisely overlapping with—those implicated in culpable-
participation claims. In a recent illustration, NAMA Holdings, LLC v. Related WMC LLC, the 
plaintiff established at trial that the defendant entity improperly interfered with its subsidiary’s 
performance of the covenant of good faith implied in contractual instruments under which the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1990)(re-ordering by relative importance to make “more perspicuous” the interrelationships 
among the six factors set forth in Restatement (Second) § 520 to determine whether an activity is 
abnormally dangerous). 
44WaveDivision, 49 A.3d at 1174. 
45Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Adipogen Corp., 82 F. Supp. 3d 568, 604 (D. Del. 2015)(applying New 
York law; unlawful means requires physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits or 
criminal prosecutions, some forms of economic pressure, or knowing breaches of fiduciary 
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subsidiary undertook custodial responsibility to hold monies while competing claimants 
(including the plaintiff) pursued arbitration against each other.46 Characterizing the subsidiary’s 
role as one defined only by contract (and not deciding whether the subsidiary, as a custodian, 
acted as a common-law agent),47 the court held that the subsidiary acted subject to an implied 
obligation of neutrality. The subsidiary breached this implied obligation by holding the funds 
until the parent and one of the claimants reached an agreement on a quid pro quo for the release, 
motivated by the parent’s wish to access funds in another account that the same claimant 
controlled.  
 Although the parent’s conduct toward the NAMA Holdings plaintiff was not 
independently tortious, the parent’s motives and objectives were directed toward harming the 
plaintiff’s contractual interests in the service of the parent’s own distinct interests. As will be 
important for the discussion in section 4, NAMA Holdings makes clear that tortious interference 
claims are not limited to expressly-delineated contractual terms but extend to the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the court held that the parent’s means were not 
themselves tortious (or a breach of fiduciary duty), the parent’s self-interested motive was 
distinct from the business interests of its subsidiary, and the parent realized its ends by agreeing 
to an explicit quid pro quo from a third party. As section 4 explains, by using problematic 
tactics—like bribes and other forms of quid pro quos—an actor who interferes with performance 
under a contract defining governance obligations may invite the assessment that the interference 
                                                                                                                                                             
obligation). 
462014 WL 6436647 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2014). I agreed to furnish expert advice as a consultant 
in this multi-dimensional dispute on issues unrelated to those raised by NAMA Holdings. 
472014 WL 6436647 at * 20. The instrument in question expressly disclaimed its creation of any 
fiduciary relationship. Id. 
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was not justifiable and thus was improper.     
 
3. THE DISTINCTIVE CULPABILITY OF ACCESSORY WRONGDOERS 
The complex and contingent character of the torts explored in this essay means that they may 
resist capture by generalized accounts of tort law. Consider in this light Arthur Ripstein’s recent  
account, which is centered on the non-instrumentalist ideas that no person is in charge of another 
(absent a special duty) and that tort law gives effect to the idea that other actors must not 
interfere with one’s own body, property, or reputation, “something you already have,” in 
Ripstein’s formulation.48 Torts can be categorized into two types of wrongs: using what is 
another’s without that person’s authorization, which explains why batteries that cause no harm 
are actionable; and damaging what is another’s, which covers the broad terrain of negligence.49 
To his credit, Ripstein acknowledges instances that test his typology. For example, fraud requires 
deceit, which wrongs the subject of the deceit, but it is actionable as a tort only if damage can be 
shown and, unlike trespass, fraud cannot be committed mistakenly.50 Ripstein accommodates 
fraud into his general typology: “the right at issue is not against being lied to, but rather against 
being deprived of what you have through deceit.”51 By itself, this rationale understates the 
complexity of fraud as a tort because the plaintiff must show not only loss but also justifiable 
                                                 
48ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 7-8 (2016). Ripstein notes that a special relationship 
between two persons may engender a duty to aid. Id. Special relationships between actors and 
other persons may create affirmative duties of care toward such persons. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 (2012). Additionally, 
an actor who undertakes to render services to another is subject to a duty of care. See id. § 42.  
49RIPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 43-44. 
50Id. at 50 n. 32. 
51Id. 
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reliance (by the plaintiff) on a misrepresentation made by the defendant.52 But, as Ripstein 
continues, “[g]etting other people to do things by deceiving them is necessarily inconsistent with 
separate persons pursuing their separate purposes,” which captures the gist of reliance.53  
 To some commentators, the separate reliance requirement underscores the relational 
quality of common-law fraud, distinct from focusing only on the defendant’s intentionally 
wrongful conduct plus economic loss suffered by the plaintiff.54 Culpable participation in 
fiduciary breach, likewise, has characteristics that resist reduction into a simple dichotomy 
between use- (and interference-) based torts and damage-based torts. Like fraud, culpable 
participation encompasses both and requires as well that the participation be done knowingly. 
Culpable participation also requires the occurrence of the primary wrong, however culpable the 
accessory may be.55 Nonetheless, Ripstein’s account helps identify the distinctive wrong effected 
through culpable participation: the justifiable expectation of a fiduciary’s loyal service is 
“something [the plaintiff] already has” and the defendant’s knowing participation in the 
fiduciary’s breach causes injury to the plaintiff.56      
More generally, a fundamental aspect of tort law that culpable participation in a breach of 
fiduciary duty underscores is the inescapable significance of duty. That is, by culpably 
                                                 
52RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 11 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
2014). For an example, see Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990)(mother of art 
collector agreed to and did pay for a painting to be chosen by collector, art dealer having falsely 
represented authenticity of chosen painting to collector; although collector had good claim 
against dealer mother did not because mother herself, albeit out of pocket, was not misled by 
dealer’s false statement).  
53RIPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 50 n. 32. 
54John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001 (2006). 
55DAVIES, supra note 12, at 32. Put differently, there’s no inchoate form of accessory liability. 
56Ripstein does not address the tort of culpable participation in fiduciary breach and explicitly 
does not attempt to extend his account to tortious interference with contract. RIPSTEIN, supra note 
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participating in a fiduciary’s breach of duty, an actor who owed the plaintiff no fiduciary duty 
becomes jointly and severally liable for harm caused to the plaintiff. An actor’s culpable 
participation, situated as an intentional tort, breaches the actor’s duty to those injured by the 
participation, distinct from the fiduciary’s duty to the beneficiary grounded in their 
relationship.57 Moreover, duty is central to understanding why an actor’s culpable participation 
cannot be premised on simple inaction,58 even when the actor knows of the fiduciary breach. 
Unless the actor (here, might we say the in- or non-actor?) owes the plaintiff a duty to take action 
grounded in a special relationship between them, tort law’s baseline rule is no-duty. Like other 
intentional torts, culpable participation requires a volitional action. As Robert Stevens formulates 
the general point, we have a right “good against the world” not to be the subject of another’s 
action that constitutes an intentional tort.59 An implication of the centrality of duty within tort 
law, explored in section 4, is that the tort of culpable participation in a breach of fiduciary duty 
(or, for that matter, in common-law fraud) does not translate into affirmative gatekeeping duties 
triggered by simple awareness of another actor’s breach of duty.  
 Framed within tort law more generally, the tortfeasors on whom this essay focuses 
                                                                                                                                                             
48, at 179 n. 32. 
57See Neilson, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (noting lack of support in California law for proposition 
that “a party must owe the plaintiff a duty before he or she can be held liable as an aider and 
abettor”; plaintiff adequately alleged that accounts administrator for investment club assisted 
primary wrongdoer in Ponzi scheme). 
58A basic premise of negligence liability is that an actor whose conduct has not created a risk of 
physical or emotional harm to another owes no duty of care to that other, in the absence of an 
affirmative duty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 37. Likewise, there’s no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of economic 
loss on another. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 (a)(Tent. 
Draft No. 1 , 2012). In tort law, “economic loss” means pecuniary damage not arising from 
injury to the plaintiff’s person or from physical harm to the plaintiff’s property. Id. § 2.  
59ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 100 (2007). Additionally, such rights “are capable of 
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represent inversions of a well-known set of actors, rescuers. Rescuers intervene as strangers to a 
situation in which another is in peril not as the result of the rescuer’s immediate conduct or a risk 
created by the rescuer. Rescuers intervene—not always successfully—in an attempt to prevent 
harm or mitigate its adverse consequences for the person in peril. The power of the no-duty 
baseline can lead to uncomfortable conclusions on normative grounds when an actor could 
attempt rescue with little effort or cost but chooses not to do so.60 On the other hand, once an 
actor initiates an attempt at rescue, the actor is subject to affirmative duties: to exercise 
reasonable care while the imperiled person is in the actor’s charge; and, if rescue is discontinued. 
to refrain from leaving the imperiled person worse off than when the rescue was initiated.61 
What’s key to the imposition of duty thus is the rescuer’s action to initiate an attempt to rescue. 
And an actor whose tortious conduct created the peril owes a duty of care to the rescuer, not just 
the imperiled person.62 Like reflected figures seen in a warped mirror, the accessory wrongdoers 
in this essay intervene in situations in which one party owes another a duty, whether defined and 
imposed by a fiduciary relationship or by contract. Accessory wrongdoers choose to intervene 
and act in one fashion or another to cause the underlying breach of duty, doing so knowingly. If 
successful they leave the person to whom the duty was owed worse off than had they not caused 
                                                                                                                                                             
being infringed without proof of fault. (The right not to be lied to is an obvious exception).” Id.  
60See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 
cmt. e (characterizing as “morally repugnant” the proposition that the law condones “an actor’s 
failure to assist another in mortal peril when the actor could do so at little or no cost ....”). 
Whether a rule requiring attempts to rescue in such circumstances would by some measure be 
efficient is beside the point, given the foundational no-duty commitment. 
61RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 44. If at 
the time rescue terminates the imperiled person reasonably appears to be in “imminent peril of 
serious physical injury,” the rescuer’s duty expands to include a duty of reasonable care 
concerning the peril itself. Id. § 44 (b). 
62Id. § 32. Liability encompasses any harm suffered by the rescuer so long as it arises from the 
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the breach of the primary or underlying duty. Seen this way, liability grounded in an accessory’s 
commission of an intentional tort—a volitional and knowing wrongful action—comes as no 
surprise. 
 Finally, how best to reconcile the liability of complicitous actors for wrongs directly 
perpetrated by other actors is of sustained concern within moral philosophy. In Christopher 
Kutz’s wide-sweeping account, the conception of authorship is crucial: “I am” he writes, “the 
exclusive author of the actions I perform myself, as well as of the events caused by those 
actions...By contrast, I am the inclusive author of the actions of the group in which I participate, 
inclusive because of those actions I am one who could say ‘We did it.’”63 To be sure, not all 
accessory tortfeasors are members of groups as ordinarily defined, but they are linked by 
intentional acts to the primary tortfeasor’s wrongful act and its consequences.64  Additionally, 
authorship as a justification for responsibility for the consequences of another’s actions does not 
entail a requirement of originality, i.e., that the idea to commit the wrong originate with the 
accessory. Copyright law tightly links originality to the legal status of authorship and the rights 
thereby conferred by the law.65 But why one would transpose the copyright definition of 
authorship into the context of accessory liability in tort law is not obvious. As the cases 
                                                                                                                                                             
attempt to rescue.   
63CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 105-06 (2000)(emphasis omitted).  
64Focusing on accountability within criminal law, Kutz concludes that inclusive authorship 
justifies “some form of complicitous liability for aiders, encouragers, and some conspirators,” 
while also concluding that inclusive authorship does not justify current criminal complicity 
doctrine, including its refusal to differentiate between the culpability of primary and secondary 
parties. Id. at 229. These issues are beyond the scope of this essay, singly focused as it is on 
private (or civil) law. However, to the extent courts exercise discretion in resolving accessory 
actors’ claims for contribution, an actor’s original authorship may undergird a restrictive 
approach. For a concrete example, see infra text accompanying notes 74-75 and 81-82.   
65What copyright protects under section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 are “original works 
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recounted in this essay illustrate, the linkages between an accessory’s wrongful conduct and that 
of the primary wrongdoer are varied. Sometimes the accessory is not the originating spark of the 
primary wrong itself; the accessory’s liability instead turns on the accessory’s own intentional 
act informed by the primary wrong, plus the accessory’s causal contribution to the primary 
wrong and loss to its victim.    
 
4 ACCESSORY WRONGDOERS AND GOVERNANCE DUTIES 
Culpable Participation in Fiduciary Breach      
The analytic and normative frameworks explored so far in this essay apply in settings in which 
accessory actors culpably participate in breaches of fiduciary duty owed by other actors. Once 
again, the foundational significance of duty within tort law shapes the role of accessory liability. 
In particular, absent special circumstances, or a contractual undertaking, an advisor—typically an 
investment bank—retained by a corporation’s board to advise its members does not owe a duty 
to the corporation’s shareholders.66 Moreover, typical terms in engagement letters make clear 
that the advisory bank works only for, and owes duties only to, the corporation, which forecloses 
an argument that the bank undertook or accepted a duty to shareholders.67 But, as section 3 notes, 
an actor’s culpable participation in a fiduciary’s breach is consistent with tort law’s duty 
requirement because so to act constitutes an intentional tort; and liability follows for the actor 
                                                                                                                                                             
of authorship.”  
66Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2008). Accord, In re Shoe-Town, 
Inc. S’holders Litig., 1990 WL 13475 at * 7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990)(dismissing claims that 
financial advisor owed fiduciary duties to shareholders when adviser that provided fairness 
opinion was retained by management group taking company private; more generally, no 
fiduciary duty owed to shareholders arises automatically on part of financial advisor).   
67Joyce, 538 F.3d at 802. 
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when the substantive elements of the tort are established. As it happens, as early as 1990 
Delaware authority acknowledged that a financial advisor might be subject to liability to 
shareholders on an aiding and abetting theory. In In re Shoe-Town Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 
the financial advisor, retained by a management group taking a company private, was allegedly 
“closely involved with the management group,” as well as with the special committee (alleged to 
be a sham and to lack independence) and the board, plus was “present and active” in a 
management group meeting that determined how to proceed to get a deal done.68 These factual 
allegations sufficed for a claim of accessory liability.   
 Thus, the salience of this tort to recent M&A litigation represents neither a doctrinal 
innovation nor an extension of prior law, just the application of well-settled tort doctrine to 
conduct in connection with a large transaction in which most—but not all—of the target’s 
directors were negligent, not conflicted or otherwise disloyal.69 Crucial to the narrative that 
follows is the fact that—as permitted by corporation statutes in Delaware and other states—
negligent directors do not confront a risk of personal monetary liability, but statutory exculpation   
does not encompass third-party defendants, like accessory wrongdoers (and is unavailable to 
directors who breach duties of loyalty or good faith).  Preceded within the prior few years by 
opinions that recognized the availability of aiding-and-abetting claims against financial advisors 
in the M&A context and expressed concerns about investment banks with conflicted interests,70 
                                                 
68In re Shoe-Town, 1990 WL 13475 at * 7-8. 
69For assertions to the contrary, see The Delaware Courts and the Investment Banks, Oct. 30, 
2015, www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.24965.15.pdf (posted by Martin 
Lipton)(noting “doctrinal innovation that first appeared about a year ago” and questioning 
whether aiding and abetting liability, “which is historically akin to civil conspiracy,” can “fairly 
be extended to regulate banker conduct?”). 
70See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005)(questioning general 
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In re Rural Metro Corp. Shareholders Litigation commanded much attention. Unusually, the 
case proceeded through trial, which generated a factually rich account of interactions between 
two M&A advisors, the board, and the special committee appointed by the target’s board.71 In 
general, the lead bank structured the sale process with the objective—not initially disclosed to 
Rural/Metro’s directors—of facilitating a financing role for itself in a sale of Rural Metro’s 
direct competitor. The structure involved an unusual two-track bidding structure that generated 
few expressions of interest in buying Rural/Metro. The lead bank also manipulated the directors’ 
deliberations by altering its valuation analysis so that the bid favored by the bank—prompted by 
its quest to obtain a role in financing that bid—looked better. And the proxy statement sent to 
Rural/Metro’s shareholders failed fully to disclose these conflicting interests and other 
shenanigans.72  
 Separately, the trial court had occasion to analyze the lead bank’s culpability relative to 
that of a secondary advisor and members of the special committee, two of whom had personal 
interests in the transaction that made them ineligible for exculpation, which is unavailable to 
directors who breach duties of loyalty or good faith.  Alone among the defendants, the lead bank 
did not settle prior to trial and later sought contribution via a settlement credit against the court’s 
judgment of $91 million,73 which represented the difference between the target’s value as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
propriety of “staple” financing via acquisition financing offered by target’s M&A advisor to 
prospective bidders); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 
2011)(M&A advisor to target, inter alia, covertly assisted potential bidders in structuring joint 
bid). See also In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012)(M&A advisor 
owned 19% equity interest in prospective buyer; advisor’s team led by banker with large 
personal shareholding in buyer). 
7188 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014)(Rural I).  
72RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 860-61 (Del 2015). 
73The full amount was $91,323,554,61. 
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going concern and the amount its shareholders received through the merger. Resolving questions 
of first impression under Delaware’s statutory regime governing contribution among joint 
tortfeasors, the court reduced the amount of the lead bank’s liability to $ 76 million.74 Crucial to 
this result was the court’s holding that the Delaware statute does not bar all intentional 
tortfeasors from seeking contribution.75 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on both liability 
and the judgment amount in RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis76 although, as we’ll see, it 
formulated the duty of M&A advisors more narrowly than did the Court of Chancery.    
 What’s most memorable about RBC Capital is neither its application of what this essay 
argues is well-settled doctrine nor the jumbo-sized judgment amount, but the character of the 
lead bank’s conduct toward its immediate advisees, the directors of the target corporation, who 
breached their fiduciary duties to shareholders by selling the company via a merger transaction 
daunted by a poorly structured process and inadequate disclosure to shareholders. In the overall 
assessment of both courts, the bank engaged in “fraud on the board.”77 At least since the late 
1980's, Delaware authority has recognized that an advisor’s failure to disclose material facts 
concerning its own wrongdoing, including its conflicted interests, constitute s fraud on the 
                                                 
74In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 102 A.3d 205 (Del. Ch. 2014)(Rural II). The full 
amount was $ 75,798,550.33. 
75Rural II, 102 A.3d at 237. The statute—the Delaware Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Law (“DUCATA”)—contains no language barring intentional tortfeasors from 
contribution. See Del. Code Ann., tit. 10, § 6302(a)(stating that “[t]he right of contribution exists 
among joint tortfeasors”), Although Rural II did not imply a categorical bar to intentional 
tortfeasors, it held that a court retains discretion to deny contribution. Rural II, 102 A.3d at 237. 
Permitting any contribution to intentional tortfeasors places Delaware in the minority among 
states, id., but in accord with Restatement (Third) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23, cmt. l (2000)(liability for intentional tort does not preclude 
contribution).     
76129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). 
77See RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 865; Rural II, 102 A.3d at 205. 
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advisee (in the M&A context, the target company’s directors).78 The underlying principle is a 
long-standing component of the common law of fraud, which premises liability on an actor’s 
failure to speak when the actor is under a duty to do so, as well as on affirmatively made 
misrepresentations.79 The principle’s applicability in this context is another illustration of the 
linkage between accessory liability and other components of tort doctrine, here because 
Rural/Metro’s shareholders themselves were not directly owed a duty by the board’s advisor and 
because the initial audience for the advisor’s misrepresentation-through-silence was the board, 
not the shareholders.80  
 As a consequence of the bank’s fraud on the board, the trial court applied the equitable 
doctrine of unclean hands to bar the bank from contribution via settlement credit for the portion 
of damages stemming from the board’s reliance on false and incomplete information furnished 
by the bank when the board—failing attentively to monitor an advisor it then knew to be 
seriously conflicted—approved the merger.81 Finally, framing the bank’s conduct within the 
broader terms explored in Section 3, its active manipulation of the board’s deliberative and 
decision-making processes stemmed from a deliberate campaign actively to dupe the board.82 Its 
conduct seems to constitute original authorship of the board’s breaches of duty, beyond   
withholding material information or joining in as an inclusive author of another actor’s breach, in 
                                                 
78Mills Acq. Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1988). 
79RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 13(b)(Tent. Draft No. 2, 
2014)(actor “in a fiduciary or other relationship with another that obliges the actor to make 
disclosure” subject to liability when that actor fails to disclose material information). 
80As Section 3 notes, the reliance requisite to common-law fraud limits potential plaintiffs.  
81Rural II, 102 A.3d at 239. 
82See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, at *2 n.7 (Del. 2016)(mem.)(characterizing bank’s 
conduct in RBC Capital: “for [its] own motives, it ‘intentionally duped’ the directors into 
breaching their duty of care”)(quoting RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 865). 
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Christopher Kutz’s terminology. 
 RBC Capital situates the analysis of duty in this context within the now-familiar terrain 
of the particular intentional tort consisting of culpable participation in another actor’s breach of 
fiduciary duty. In dictum, the Court of Chancery cast duty in broader and uncharted terms by 
situating financial advisors in M&A transactions as “gatekeepers” because they provide 
consequential expert services to non-expert clients.83 Although the dictum did not sketch out all 
implications, one likely candidate would be that undertaking to serve as an M&A advisor creates 
a relationship on the basis of which the law imposes affirmative duties. But the dictum did not 
elaborate the implications, including to whom such duties are owed and what conduct would 
satisfy them. RBC Capital rejects the dictum, instead emphasizing that “[t]he banker is under an 
obligation not to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of the board of directors, thereby 
undermining the very advice that it knows the directors will rely upon in their decision making 
processes.”84 The duty analysis in RBC Capital also emphasizes the role of contract in shaping 
an advisor’s engagement.85 Thus, if a bank agrees to provide only limited services to target 
directors in connection with a transaction, the bank is not subject to liability as an accessory to 
the directors’ breach of duty on the theory that, had the bank undertaken to do more, its 
expanded service would have prevented loss suffered by shareholders.86 RBC Capital does not 
reject the possibility that an engagement agreement, in addition to defining the scope of the 
engagement, might also define and delimit an advisor’s responsibilities to its client; but the 
                                                 
83Rural Metro I, 88 A.3d at 88. 
84RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 865 n. 191. 
85Id. 
86Houseman v. Sagerman, 2014 WL 1600724 at * 10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2014)(no duty for bank 
to “provide all or none of the financial services [bank] offers in valuing and marketing a 
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bank’s actual engagement letter used only general language to disclose the bank’s conflicts and 
“disclosed none of the conflicts that ultimately emerged.”87 Later cases, not explored here, make 
clear the significance of full disclosure to shareholders in connection with an uncoerced vote to 
approve a merger: this insulates the transaction from judicial inquiry into its merits and 
forecloses aiding-and-abetting claims against accessory actors by dooming claims that the 
target’s directors breached their fiduciary duties.88  
 It’s open to question whether the regime of accessory liability recounted above is optimal 
to deter conflicts on the part of M&A advisors and, more broadly, to serve investors’ interests, 
given the low likelihood that directors of target companies would confront a significant risk of 
personal monetary liability. Andrew Tuch observes that by relying on a form of secondary 
liability, the accessory liability regime opens up the possibility that “a brazenly disloyal M&A 
advisor may cause real harm without either misleading the board or creating an informational 
vacuum,” thereby arguably positioning itself beyond the risk of accessory liability,89 as would 
surely be true as well when directors, notwithstanding their advisor’s disloyalty, do not breach 
their duties.90 Acknowledging that Delaware’s options are limited, Tuch urges Delaware courts 
to provide fuller guidance to directors on structuring and overseeing relationships with M&A 
advisors, and, venturing further, to consider restructuring the confines of duty to reposition M&A 
                                                                                                                                                             
company”). 
87129 A.3d at 865 n. 191. 
88See In re Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., __ A.3d __, 2016 WL 3626521 at * 18 (Del. Ch. June 
30, 2016), relying on In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig. v. Corwin, 101 A.3d 980, 
1003 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 
2015).  
89Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 1079, 1146 
(2016). 
90Id. For example, the conclusion that there’s no breach of duties by directors seems to follow 
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advisors in direct relationships to shareholders.91    
Alternative Entities and Contractual Governance Duties 
Setting aside any qualms about the optimality of the accessory liability regime premised on 
breach of fiduciary duty, we turn now to a setting predominantly characterized by uncertainty 
about applicable legal doctrine. As Section 1 noted, entities that are not corporations may, as 
permitted by state organizational law, be structured so that governance duties are specified 
entirely by contractual provisions that eliminate or supplant conventional fiduciary duties. 
Enough time has elapsed since Delaware’s enactment of alternate-entity statutes permitting the 
elimination of fiduciary duties to generate thoughtful assessments of the consequences. 
Reflecting on their experience adjudicating many alternate-entity disputes, Leo Strine and J. 
Travis Laster concluded that what the statutes enabled was not bargained-for contract terms, but 
the imposition of terms on a take-it or leave-it basis by alternate-entity promoters and 
managers.92 And liberated to impose their own terms, managers were often caught by infelicitous 
drafting, while generalized or standardized formulations of governance duties failed to emerge.93 
Focusing on an important subset of alternate entities, master limited partnerships that are 
publicly-traded, Sandra Miller and Karie Davis-Nozemack concluded that the one-sided cast of 
governance terms significantly disadvantaged investors, most of them individuals over the age of 
fifty who seek secure income-generating investments, thereby calling into question whether 
investment into such entities is sufficiently informed and adequately discounts for the risks posed 
                                                                                                                                                             
from a fully informed and uncoerced shareholder vote to approve the transaction. 
91Id. at 1149. 
92E. Leo Strine & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATE FORMS OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 12-13 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein, eds. 2015). 
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by the absence of fiduciary duties.94 For Miller and Davis-Nozemack, in publicly-traded entities, 
“fiduciary duty waivers...should end.”95 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, M&A transactions in the alternate entity world raise issues about 
accessory culpability comparable to those explored in Section 3, but the application of general 
doctrine in this context is undeveloped. An important starting point is that, although Delaware 
statutes permit the alteration or elimination of fiduciary duties within LLCs and partnerships, 
these statutes do not permit the elimination of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. The implied covenant differs from fiduciary-duty concepts of good faith because its 
temporal focus is ex ante, not the time of the alleged breach, and substantively the implied 
covenant envisions, not loyalty to the counterparty, but “faithfulness to the scope, purpose, and 
terms of the parties’ contract.”96 By attempting to take advantage of a procedure specified in a 
contractual variant of fiduciary duty—such as obtaining a fairness opinion from a qualified 
financial advisor to bless a conflicted M&A transaction—a general partner may breach the 
implied covenant when its conduct is arbitrary or unreasonable.97 For example, hypothesized the 
Delaware Supreme Court, “suppose the controller [general partner] outright bribes the financial 
                                                                                                                                                             
93Id. at 27. 
94Sandra K. Miller & Karie Davis-Nozemack, Toward Consistent Fiduciary Duties for Publicly 
Traded Entities, 68 FLA. L. REV. 317-18 (2016). 
95Id. at 320. 
96ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 
434, 442 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 
2013). For a theoretical account of this distinction, see Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and 
Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul M. Miller eds. 2014). 
97Gerber v. Enterprise Holdings, LLC, 67 A3d 400, 420 (Del.), overruled on other grounds by 
Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013). 
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advisor to opine (falsely) that the transaction is fair.”98 Paying the bribe would, in the court’s 
assessment, breach the implied covenant.99  
 But would a financial advisor, induced by a bribe to falsify its opinion, itself be subject to 
liability if the falsified opinion contributed to another actor’s breach of its contractually-specified 
governance duties? And what of financial advisors whose problematic conduct is less extreme 
than taking a bribe or some other explicit quid pro quo? For example, in In re El Paso Pipeline 
Partners, L.P. Derivative Litigation, a financial advisor opined on the fairness of transactions 
through which a corporate parent sold two subsidiaries to a limited partnership it controlled 
through an LLC that served as the limited partnership’s sole general partner.100 The advisor used 
a standard engagement letter that charged a fee of $500,000 plus expenses, the entire fee being 
contingent on the advisor’s issuance of a fairness opinion. In the latter of two transactions, the 
court held that the general partner breached the limited partnership agreement because the 
committee designated by the agreement to assess conflict transactions did not form the subjective 
belief, as the agreement required, that purchasing the subsidiary was in the limited partnership’s 
best interest. To be sure, the general partner did not bribe the financial advisor to issue a fairness 
opinion—notwithstanding the all-or-nothing quality of the contingency-fee arrangement—but in 
the court’s assessment the advisor failed to perform the work of an advisor to the committee, 
instead seeking only to “make the price that Parent proposed look fair,” the advisor’s “real 
client” being the deal on which its entire fee depended.101 Although the advisor’s conduct 
appears potentially consistent with the factual requisites for some form of accessory liability, the 
                                                 
98Gerber, 67 A.3d 400, 420.  
99Id. 
1002015 WL 1815846 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2015). 
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court deemed the secondary liability claims waived after the plaintiffs did not develop them in a 
meaningful fashion.102  
 Helping to explain why these theories may be underdeveloped, Miller and Davis-
Nozemack note discrepant approaches as between the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of 
Chancery.103 In Gerber, not only did the Supreme Court hypothesize conduct by a general 
partner that would breach the implied covenant by paying a bribe, it remanded the case to the 
Court of Chancery to assess the legal sufficiency of claims that the accessory defendants 
tortiously interfered with contract rights and aided and abetted the general partner’s breach of 
duty.104 But opinions from the Court of Chancery dismiss the possibility of claims for aiding and 
abetting a breach of contract, which may also have stymied the development of tortious 
interference claims in this context.105 It’s hard to see a principled basis for a categorical 
exclusion of accessory liability in the alternate-entity world. After all, unjustified interference 
with another party’s contractual rights is a well-established tort, as cases like NAMA Holdings 
illustrate for Delaware. To be sure, the interfering actor in that case was a parent corporation, not 
a third-party advisor, but that difference seems immaterial to the reach of the general principle.106   
                                                                                                                                                             
101In re El Paso, 2015 WL 1815846 at * 24. 
102Id. at * 2. 
103Miller & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 94, at 303-04. 
104A year later, Gerber settled. See 2014 WL 2967718 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2014)(trial order). 
105See Miller & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 94, at 303 (discussing Zimmerman v. Crothall, 
2012 WL 707238 at *19 (Del. Ch. 2012) and Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., 113 A.3d 167, 
194 (Del. Ch. 2014).  
106Recently the Court of Chancery acknowledged in dictum that the implied covenant could be 
breached when the organizational agreement calls for approval by a committee of independent 
directors if the general partner bribed the committee. The bribe-induced approval of a conflict 
transaction would “fundamentally deprive the unitholders [in the limited partnership] of the 
benefit of the bargain, the protection of an independent committee.” See Employees Ret. Sys. v. 
TC Pipelines GP, Inc., 2016 WL 2859790 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2016).   
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5 CONCLUSION 
The central claim in this essay is that connections between tort law and fiduciary obligation 
should not be overlooked.107 Explaining the distinctive wrongfulness of assisting in a fiduciary’s 
breach of duty requires situating the inquiry within the framework of tort doctrine more 
generally. Actors who culpably participate in a fiduciary’s breach themselves, as intentional 
tortfeasors, breach a duty to the fiduciary’s beneficiary; they contravene the beneficiary’s right 






                                                 
107 But I do not propose that tort law does or should subsume the entirety of fiduciary 
obligation.  
